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CITIZENSHI P'S LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS: CONVENTION
AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Kif Augustine
Citizenship acls as a coonJination solut.ion
OJ'ganizing a legal society into members and nonmembers. Despite this fairly simple definition, the
nature of citizenship remains a diflicult concept.
The primary diflicull.y in understanding the nature
of citizenship resides in the tension between the
contractual and the natural rights perccptions of
society.
The
contractual
approach
emphasizes
the
reciprocal duties and rights of individuals and
community. The communit.y sets the st.andard for
exclusion or inclusion, tcrminating or pl'cc\udingt.he
relationship when it. is not beneficial to itself. The
citizen also fl'('c\y t.erminates t.he relationship if he
finds the particular eonditions of membership
onerous, bul the st.andards set by the society
condition his initial inclusion.
As a community
membCl', the individual fulfills dut.ies and pal'ticipall's
in the polit.ical proccss. In retul'll, hc receives the
substantial
benefit.s
of
communit.y
life
and
government. prot.ection.
Overall, the communit.y's
needs balance against. the individual's needs.
The natural right.s pen:eplion, on t.he ollll'r hand,
holds t.he individual's nceds paramount.
Man has
right.s that arc inherent in his being and these
society cannot violate, no mat.t.er t.he communal
needs.
Therefore, {:itizcnship carries lillie weight.
The individual docs not have any dut ies to the
community; t.he community exists t.o benefit lhe
individual.
Whichever t.heoretical appl'llach one takes, living
in a cOlllmunit.y obviously requil'l's some nlOrdination
between individuals. 1·'01' that. maUer, any human
interaclion, however simple, funclions on mut ual
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expectations.
The real eoonlination problem is
understanding anoUll'r's expectations, or rat.her
ident.ifying what that. person exped.s you to exped
of him (Schelling I !l(i:l, 5·1).
On a sm·idal level,
conventional agreements in many forms (laws,
traditions, ct(:.) coordinat.e individual expectations.
As Reynolds points Ollt, coordination solut.ions in the
fill·m of conventions simplify life and reducp
uncert.ainty, tllllS benefitting the individual (1!IH7,
5).
By ddincaling l'xpcctations, eoonJination
solutions provide a practical, eonH~ntional framework
in which individuals and communities operat.e.
The consequenCl's of citizenship as a coordination
solution will be discussed in light or the contractual
and nallu·al rights vil'ws of socil·ty. In the practical
arena, the concept of eil.izenship developed by the
V.S. Supreme Court. denwnstra/cs the tension
between these two views.
Alien parUeipal.ion and
expatriation will be two at·eas of emphasis.

THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION
For· citizenship to be valuable, it must entail
ceI·lain p.·ivileges t.hat are denied the alien.
Essentially, these privileges arc embodied in a
distinction between roles.
The citizen fills many
formal roles which the alien may not, while they
share the infi,rmal role of subject.
Most basically, citizenship itself is a role.
Citizenship grants the individual a paJticipatory role
in the legal eommunity.
Cit.izens define the legal
eommunity as they modify and change it; therefi)J"e,
they are ultimately responsible for its fill·m in ways
non-members arc not.
Citizenship also allows the
individual atTeSs to more onit-ial roles slJl~h as juror,
legislator, and judge, roles that further develop and
define the (~OInrnunit.y. Citiwns can partieipate ill
the political process.
III addition to his participatory roll's, till' ("it iZ('1l
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shares the role of subjed witll the alien.
I\s
suhjed, the individual complies with and supports
the conventions of soeidy. lie abides by the law,
pays taxes, fulfills military duty, participates in Uw
advantages of the system by selting up a business,
sends children 1~1 school, and is inl(lnned on issues.
Overall, he contributes 1.0 the success of the system.
In these instances of everyday lile, the alien's
actions and duties are indistinguishable from those
or a citizen.
The citizen, nonetheless, retains a
part.icipal.ory advantage.
While the rranchise is often deemed a necessary
characteristic of the citizenship role, it is not always
a reliable tool 1<11' measuring participat.ion.
Some
citizens are denied the vot.e while at times aliens
are allowed 1.0 vot.e. Children receive protedion as
citizens but their participat.ion in the polit.ical process
is
severely
limited.
Convicts
retain
their
membership in the political community--they are still
citizens--but not their ability ti, participate in the
political decision-making pnlcess because they violate
the laws and conventions of that community.
Indeed, an ex-felon can be denied the vote evt.'Jl
after he has served a prison sentence and CIImplet.ed
parole (11 ichnnisotl II. Numirez 4 1H lJ .S. 24 I 1!t7 -, n.
lIisulrically, women were denied the franchise
while still counted as citizens (Mitior II. lIupperselt
Sup. Cl. Oct.. 1874 H(2). Likewise, at othcr times
voting privileges were determined hy pJ'()perty
ownership, not citizenship status. Currently, Puert.o
Ricans are lJ .S. citizens but are not n'JlI'esl'ntt.,d hy
a voting member in Congress; nor do they participate in ,federal l~ledions.
Indeed, the recognition
of Puerul Ril'ans as United Stat.es citizl'ns was based
on the assumption that t.heir citizenship was
substantively different. (see :1:1 Congressional Record
247:1-74 as quoted in Cabrancs, 1!t7H, :17) .
•Just as Ull' fnlll('hi~w is sometimes dcnied t.o
cit.izcns, it IHls at tillH's bel'n granted to aliens.
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Currently, a nwnber of SC<lndina vian count.rimi grallt.
f(lreign nationals tile right. to vot.e in local and
regional elections and even hold eledive of1ice (Tung
1HH5, 45:0.
In the Unit.ed St.at.es, a number of
st.ates allowed aliens t.he vote in the inid-I HOOs
(B,oseberg I H77, IOn!), and aliens were completely
excluded from vot.ing in presidential elections only in
1B2H (Aylsworth I n:ll, 114).
The justificat.ion for excluding individuals from the
vole varies over lime, thus relleding t.he tension and
interplay bet.ween t.he natll,·al rights and «:ontractual
theories.
Although it seems unfair to a modern
mind formed in a t.radition of individualism and
independence that women were excluded fmm the
f,·anchise, they wel'C ,·eprescnted and conside,·cd full
citizens in an cra whcre representation and power
were wielded by families rather than by individuals.
The family filled t.he part.icipat.ory role.
With the
indust.rial revolution, the concept of a completely
independent woman, especially linancially, bccame a
possibilit.y.
Such a woman was rare if nOot noncxist.ent in previous ages.
Therefore, a woman,
although denied t.hc vot.e, was fully reprcscnted as
a citizen through . her family, specifically her
husband, in the elcctoral proccss. Thc contractual
notion prevailed.
The valuc of citizenship, despitc an inconsistent
applicat.ion of thc franchisc, remains problematic only
if a spccific definition of cit.izL·nship is ,·cquircd and
forccd upon the past.
Whilc the content of
citizenship, meaning t.hc privilcgcs and bcnefits
granted to cach citizen, changes and may indccd be
dirTcrent for specific citizens at a givcn time, a
citizen is nonetheless an official membcr or the
Jlolit.ical communit.y. Cit.izens are always represented
in the political process. They change and modify
the legal and political framework t.hat. governs their
lives even if rcpresentation and participation has not.
always been as sJlecific and directly aimed at t.hc
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individual as it is today. The communit.y and the
individual define
the cit.izen
as an insider.
Consequently, Iw is allowed privileges the community
has decided are spe(~ifically relevant t.o membership.
The alien is an outsider and denied those privileges,
whatever they are.

CI1'IZENSHIP AS CONTRACT
The mere existence of citizenship supports a
contractual approach to society. Citizenship is not
even relevant unless t.hel·e is a society t~) be a
member
of;
citizenship
defines
the
political
communit.y. Furthermore, citizenship has never been
considel'ed an absolulc I'ight del'ived from me.-e
exislcnce, not even in an age commitlcd t.o
individualism.
Aliens do not have the I'ight to
become citizens.
Once a member of the group,
one's right to remain a member may be paramount;
however, obtaining membership is not the right of
anyone.
The I mmigration Reform and Cont rol Ad of 1mHi
provides amnesty to many illegal aliens but docs so
only for those individuals who can meet the
standards of I'esidency, English language ahility and
other crilcl'ia set by Congress,
Not everyone is
admitlcd, and those who are enter the political
pmcess at the communit.y's initiative and diserclion,
The Supreme Court expressed t.his notion more
explicitly in lIlIitt'd Stuics 0. (Jills/l('''~ (~4:1 U.S. 472
II B 171> and ,IO/WIIII('ssell II. IIl1itl'd S/utl's (225 U.S.
227 II !tl2-J).
(jill ,'ihI'T'M , emphasizing t.he decisions
reached in ,/(I"{lfIlWSS(~/I, argues t.hat. "an alien who
seeks political rights as a member of t.his Nat ion
can rightfully obt.ain tlwm only upon t.erms and
conditions specified hy Congress. Courts are wit.hout.
aut horit.y to sllndion dlanges or modifications" (24:1
U.S. at 474). Congn·ss, as repl'l'sl'ntativl's of tlw
commllility, IllUSt. (kt'itie the "terms and eondit.ioll::i"
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under which any individual can participate in the
political process of t.he nat ion. Moreover, "no alit'n
has the slightest right. to nat.uralization unless all
st.atutory requirements arc complied wit.h" (24:1 U.s.
at 4 75). In this case, t.he Court reeognize~ t.hal lhe
community decides who will be admitt.cd; lhe
individual has no right to membership unless he
complies with the standards set by the community.
If the statulory requirements are mcl., then the
individual must be admitt.cd; bUl as a non-member
of the society he has no right and no real way lo
change the standards lhe community sets.
llis
membership is dependent on their good will.

STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSION
The pot.cntially discriminatory nature of dtii'.enship
becomes almost immediately obvious.
I':ssenlially,
the definition of members and IHIIl-members of a
political communit.y is an arbit.rary ad, a necessary
dist.indion presently governed by little besides lhe
values and decisions of the eommunity itself.
(<;xc\usion of some is Ill'ct'ssary to the ident.ity, even
lhe exist.cnce, of the community. A eommunily is
formed by individuals sharing values and traditions,
which nat.urally implies that tlll're arc oUll'rs who
do not share the same traditions and values.
In a spt'cifk community, rule of law and
constructive unanimit.y provide a mdalegal standard
for' dedsion-making, a standanJ spedlically designed
to prevent. discriminatioll.
Rule of law requires
genemlity, that individuals or individual groups be
essent.ially unidentifiable for' privileges or punishment.
Under the rules and procedures of the legal system,
no one is above t.he law, as all individuals arc
treat.ed equally.
The rules must be prospective
"ather than rcl.roactive, sunicicntly puLlkiwd, and
clearly stat.ed (Reynolds I !lHfi, :1, 4). Discrimination
against. communit.y members is tlll'l'eby pH·venled.

CITIZI~NSHIP
Constructive unanimity, substituting fill" complete
unanimity, serves as the most important aspect of
rule of law.
Constructive unanimity implies a
cOOl"dination solution where certain individuals such
as legislatm"s are entrusted with the decision-making
power, but rule of law circumscribes their decisions
so that any decision they reach is one that could
have belm reached hy the community as a whole.
Rule of law and consll"uctive unanimity arc simple,
effective (~oordinat.ion solutions t.o t.he problem of
governing a large hody.
Rule of law and constructive unanimity do not,
however, answer thc qllestion of who should and
who should not he included in the community in
the first place. Rule of law prohibits discrimination
among
individuals
for
spel"ilie
benelits
or
punishments, but. citizenship itself is discriminat.ory
in the drawing of community lincs"
Constructive
unanimity depends upon a definition of insiders and
outsiders, a definition of those whose opinion really
matlers.
Such is not the ease of course if the
eommuni~y is .all- inclusive and thc world becomes
the unit of decision. But a world community if' not
a viable coordination solution to the prohlems of
govCl'nance; the world divides itself into competing
and distinct legal systems. And any unit less than
a wodd community demands a definition of
member"s. Rule of law and construdivl' unanimity
reduce discrimination, but only within an already
defined community.
In its discriminatory nature, l~itizcnship is logically
bound to the {'onventions of the admitting society.
The comm.unity will admit those whose presence it
finds beneficial and exclude those who pose a threal
economically, medically, even culturally.
The
contnlct of citizenship must Iwnefit both t.he
individual and the l~ollllllunity" The alicn benefits
the society lind indicatl's his dl'sirl' for communit.y
membership hy l'omplying with its wnventions.
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Tlw individual's abilily 10 support. community
conventions, however, rests on his physil~al locat.ion
in t.he (~omlllunit.y sincl~ territorial houndaries are t.he
cUlTent. solution to jul'isdidional pmblems. TClTit.orial
bordcrs arc a simple, effcdivl' (,(Hlrdinatitin solution
as I hey define parametcrs for both jurisdiction and
membership.
The legal alil'Il's prcsence in the
count.ry is consented to hy I he members of the
communit.y as he mel certain standards prior to his
physical admittance.
Illegal aliens prcsent a unique problem in that
they circumvent Ihe consensual pmccss of the
community by ent.ering unlawfully. But the alicn's
very abilit.y IH demonstrate his own consent depends
on that. circumvent.ion.
Ont"e bere physically, it
becomes increasingly dinicult IH dist.inguish between
illegal aliens, legal aliens and citizens in the
pelformance of duties t.o the ('Ollllllunity, if the alien
pays t.axes and is law abiding. In some ways they
may even embody the ideal of the community mtU'e
than actual members.
In a nat.ion built by
immigrant.s such as t.he United St.ates, t.he
immigrant. family "making it" after years of struggle
and hard work stands as a testament to the values
and opportunities many consider the essence of
America.
An immigrant. family becomes American, not only
because they identify themselves with t.he American
ideal, but also because of the generous tradition of
citizenship the United States offers. Any individual
born here, with a few diplomatic exceptions,
aUhlmatically receives American cit.izenship regm'dless
of the parents' legal 01' illegal presence, nationality,
race, 01' religion.
Whether an individual alien
nat.uralizes 01' not, in a generation or t.wo his family
aut.omat.ically becomes American.
The citizcnship
conventions in t.he United Stat.es are broadly
inclllsive.
If the alicn can clearly idl'lIlify himself wilh the
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core values of the communily and demonstrate his
commitmenl lo that t:ommunily through per/ill'mance
of specific duties, docs the fact lhat he entered
illegally really maUer'! II' one slresses the nat.ural
rights perspective, lhe answer is no; lhe individual's
"ighl Lo self-detel'lninat.ion weighs heavily. On lhe
othe,' hand, if one applies conlract theory, the illegal
alien's violation of communily standards for enlrance
undermines the societ.y itself. The present solution
Lo illegal entry in the Immigration Reform and
Contl'Ol Act. of I HtW mixes the lwo views. Il is a
ve,'y pract.ical solulion t.o a difficull problem. Mosl
impol'l.anlly, as a congressional ad, lhe solut.ion is
conventional and bound by conslruclive unanimity;
the illegal alien may legalize his slatus but only
according to communily slandards.
A like queslion centers around consenl but not
physical presence in the communily; should nol
anyone who agrees tH the convenlions of a
community, a legal sociely, then be considered a
membe,', no maU~r where they live'! In this case,
lhe answer is no, simply because the benefits
traditionally associated wit.h a nation-slalc would be
nearly impossible Lo pJ'()vide. Pl'Oteding a population
from enemy aUack when that population is scaUered
around the world would prove extremely dillicull.
Governments presently issue warnings against travel
in specific areas or evacuat.e citizens frolll
troublesome areas.
Physical protedion is limit.ed,
Of course, exceptions can he given, but it is
obviously more difficult to proted a scattered
population . than one bound by terrilHrial and
t.hel·efore relatively contmllahle horders. Other public
goods for which government takes responsibility
would also he diflicull I~l pl'Ilvide, Cit.iwnship and
t.errit~)rial
distinctions go
hand
in
hand
as
coordination solutions,
Given
Ihe necessarily arbitrary nature of
IC'Titorial bOlllHiarips and the lack of a IIIctalegal
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standard for inclusion or exclllsion, natural rights
and cont.ractual theory place compet.ing demands on
citizenship.
Within the United Statt's, the
contraclual approach overrides any natural rights
presumption or citizenship. Nonet.heless, the nat.ural
rights approach strongly innuences the granting or
civil rights and el~onomic bcnelits t~) aliens, making
citiwnship
basically
a
polit.ical
designation.
ConsequenLly, it is impossiblc tH show a consist.cnt.
application or either natural rights or cont.raclual
theory in the wnCl'pt or ritizenship developed by the
U.S. Suprcllll' Court.
Even the recent t.tmdency
t(}wards individual rights in expatriation cases and
civil rights cases is mitigated Ly a contractual
app,"oach in alien participation cases.

CIVIL RIGHTS FOH ALIENS
Although the United States Const.itution and Bill
of Rights define the nature of the American polit.ical
community, they are applicable ~) all those
physically present in the United States whether they
al"e oflicial members of t.he community 01" not. In
1885, the Supreme COlll"t argued in Yick Wo u.
Hopkins (118 U.s. 35H [ISSH» that
The Fourt.eenth Amendment t~) the Constitution
is not confined to the proteclion of cit.izens .
. . . These provisions are universal in their
application, tH all persons within the tcrritorial
jurisdiclion, without regard t.o any diflcrell("cs
or racc, or color, or of nationalit.y; and the
equal prot.ecl.ion or the laws is a pledge of t.he
protection of equal laws (liS U.S. :l!i(; at
:U;U).

Thcrefo,"e, "all persons," no\' jllst cit in'ns, are
entitled 1,0 t.he equal proll'clion of t.he laws or t.hl'
United St.ales.
Even illegal ;dil'lIs ren~ivl' l·qual
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rights pmtecl.ion.
In a semie, sllch a broad application or equal
protedion seems a denial or a community's distinct
responsibility to proted its citizens in return fill'
their strict allegiance, as opposed (,() all others whose
allegiance is limited alt.hough they may be present
"within 'the lerri('()rial jurisdidiOIl" or the United
Stales govenunenl.
By its very wording, equal
protection be(:omes the right of the individual, but
a right granted (,() him by a political community
t.hat values rights. The right is inviolale but only
because the community deems it so.
The
Fourleenth Amendml~nt. grant.s equal protedion (,() all
per'sons because the American pcople value such
rights.
Given the individual's absolule right (,() equal
protection, what right does t.he stale have when
observing its dut.y to provide equal protedion'l Is
the individual's right to equal protection always
trump against. the stale's needs to define it.self'?
Although Y ick Wo II. Hopkins grant.s broad protedion
t.o citizens and aliens alike, it does not oblit.erale
the dist.ineLion between the two in tt'rms of their
respedive roles.
An examination or Iwo Supreme
Court cases citing \' ick Wo demonstrates Ihat. equal
prntedion applies to the alien in his role as subjcd,
as a private individual, but not necessarily in his
pal·ticipation in t.he polilical arena. I';qual protedioll
docs 1I0t. grant. politiml privileges.
Alt.hough polilical part.it'ipation is not part or
equal Pi'll led ion, Iht' Court finds Ihal welrare
bcnefits arc. (]mlwm II. Uicllllnisoll (·10:1 U.S. :1fi5
11 B70 D st.ruek down slale law denying welrare
benefits 10' alit'lls since the Fourtl'enth Amendllll'nt.
applies 10 all pl'rsons, eili,..cm. and alil'ns (.1n:l U.S.
:lfi!i at :n I).
TIll'n·rorl', Ihe COUl'l hdd "Ihal a
st.all' stat.ule thaI dl'nil's wdrare bl'ncfils 10 residcnl
aliells who havc not. n·sidl·d in Ihe Unill'd Stales 1'01'
a specifil'd IIIlmber or Yl'ars violates till' Equal

!IH

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

Prot.ection Clausc" (4 l:l U.S. :W5 at :nU). Gmhum
further maintains that the community's "concern fill'
litical
integrity"
is
not
a
justification
for
classifications (4 1:1 U.S. :W5 at :175).
I
n
GmJHlm, the Court fails t~1 recognize that the
communit.y granted equal prot.cet.ion rights in t.he
first place.
Y ick Wo v. I/opkitls certainly did not
indicat.e
that.
the
community's
needs
were
unimport.ant.
A COlTllllllllity which values rights,
such as the United Stat.es, will obviously grant more
rights t~1 individuals t.han a t~ommunit.y without. such
values.
But right.s UlClllseives enme as a societal
grant, not. naturally,
Gmhum's decision sct a new prccedent by
emphasizing individual rights as it overt.urned Pcople
IJ. Cmllc (214 N. Y.
I r,4 II!)J 5 D.
P.-eviously, as
Graham notes, Cmlll' set a standard emphasizing thc
integrity of the community over the rights of the
intlividual:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed,
but not. arbitrary discrimination, Itlr till'
principlc or exclusion is tile rcstriction of the
resources of the stat.e UI the advancement and
profit
of
lhe
members
or
the
state.
Ungcnerous and unwise such discrimination
may be. It. is not. f(lI' that reason unlawful .
. . . The state in determining what lise shall
be made of its own moneys, may legitimately
consult. lhe welfare of it.s own cit.izens rat.her
t.han that of aliens.
Whatevcr is a privilege
rather t.han a right., may be made dependent
upon citizenship. In its war against. poverty,
the state is not required t.o dedicate its own
resources t.o cit.izens and aliens alike (214 N. Y.
)54 at Hi), lti4).

GruJwm's concern f(lI' t.hc individual
CrOlle's cOIH:crn for t.he communit.y.

overwhelms

i
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NYllltisl I). Multdel (4:1~ u.s. I 11!1'Ilil) shows a
further
emphasis
on
Lroad
equal
proteclion
application for aliens. State financial aids may not
be restricted to citizens hut mllst abo he availaLle
to resident aliens regardless of their intent to
Lecome citizens.
III a ;'·4 judgment, the Cou.·t
decided that educating the eleclorate is not a
sullicient justification for excluding aliens from
student financial assistance.
Resident aliens pay
their share of taxes alld should benefit from
contributing to the programs these taxes support
(4:12 U.S. I at I I).
La('k of citizenship is
essentially a political liahility: "And although an
alien may be baITed from full involvement in the
political arena, he may play a role-·perhaps even a
leadership J"()le--in other areas of import to the
community" (4:12 U.S. I at 12). Partieipation in all
nOll-political benefits is not. limited.
In their dissenting opinions, .Justices Burger,
Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist stress contraclual
theOl·Y. The community docs have a special interest
in pJ"()viding educatioll I~) UlOse who will remain to
benefit the community (4:12 U.S. 1 at 14). Powell
argues that "states have a substantial interest in
encouraging allegiance IH the United States on the
pa.·t of all persons, including resident aliens, who
have come to live within their borders" (4:12 U.S.
1 at 16).
Moreover, the community has made it
very easy for the alien u) remove himself from the
excluded category by declaring an intent to become
a citizen or by becoming a citizen if he is currently
eligible (4:1-2 U.S. I at ~().
)n this case, the t:ollllllunity dclines a standard
whereLy an individual may benefit fully from
financial aids if he only declares an allegianw t~) the
community. The alien already receives benefits from
t.he communit.y and his ineligihility for additional
henclit.s rests only 011 his unwillingn .. ss 10 fully
commit to the cOllllllunily. AllY inveslllll'lIt should
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yield a JlI"Oi"lt. 01' hl'Ill'i"l1 10 t.hl' invest.o!'. The St.at.e
or New York invl'st.s in it.s ('itizens and resident
aliens who demonst.rat.l' a desire to become citizens
in a perfectly understandable el'lillot to build the
eornmunilyo
In t.he end, Ihe dissenting opinion
supports the community, but the individuoal winso

ALIEN PARTICIPATION
In contrast. to civil right.s and equal prolt~ction, in
the political realm the community retains great
power
in
delcrmining
the
exlcnt
of
alien
pal"loicipation. SIl/:urmUTI II. /)ollgull (4 1:1 U.S. 6:l4
II H7:Jl) allows exclusion of aliens from jobs that
precisely relat.e to t.he political pmeess even though
the decision st.ruck down a stat.e statulc limiting
pennanent. civil service employment to citizens. The
judiciat,y recognized that a slate has a special
interest. "in establishing its own fi,nn of government,
and in limiting participat.ion in that government to
t.hose who are within 'the basic conception or a
polit.ical communit.y'"
(41:1 U,S. (j:14 at. 642),
Therefore citizenship can he a
qualifier fill'
par'ticipalion ill a number of oCl"upaLiolls. Aliens al'c
not members or t.he community in Ihe same way
that citizcns arc and hold only thosc political rights
that the community grants them.
SllgarmaTl's standard fill' exclusion of aliens from
specific jobs outlines the formal parLicipahlry roles,
Thesc roles logically reflect lhe responsibilities or
those
who
define
t.he
community
and
the
communit.y's need for self-definition:
And t.his power and responsibilit.y of the State
applies, not only IH the qualificat.ion of vot.ers,
hut also to persons holding state clective or
impor!.ant nonelective cxecut.ivc, legislative, and
judicial positions, fill' officers who participate
directly in t.he f"nnulation, execut.ion, or
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review, of broad public policy perfill"m functions
that go 1.0 the heart or" r('presentative
government.
There, as ,Judge Lumbard
phrased it in his separate concurrence, is
. where
dtizenship
bears
sOllie
rational
relationship to the spedal demands of the
particular position' (:I:HI I". Supp. at B 11,
quoted in 4 13 U.S. fi:14 at fi47).
Citizenship docs bear a rational relationship to the
demands of political positions. S,,/-:armall recognizes
the pel'sona, the political role, as distinct from the
individual, since it does not deny civil '"ight.s t.o
aliens while still limit ing political participation (4 1:1
U.S. n:14 at 64 I).
The responsibilit ies of that
political role are disl.inet. fnHn the rights of the
individual but explidlly linked to the rights of the
dtizen.
The alien's obligations t~) obey the
conventions of the society in which he lives a1'e
similar to those of a fit iZl'n (4 1:1 U.S. ti:14 at H4 Ii),
even while his alienage limits his participation in the
political system.
Although he argues for upholding the citizenship
requirement for civil service employment in New
Ym·k in his dissent.ing opinion, ,'ustice Rehnquist
essentially uses the same contractual theory
expl'essed in the opinion of the court.
lie argues
that citizenship is an important dassificat.ion, rar
more important than t.he majority SlIgarmall opinion
expresses. '''or him, (·it.i".enship is "a st.atus in and
relationship with a sociely which is nmtinuing and
more basic than ml'n~ presence or residence" (4 1:1
U.S. H:14 .at (ifi2).
It should have value beyond
the political rcalm (-11:1 U.S. fi:14 at lifiH).
Ironically enllllgh, in arguing the v a It 1(' or citizl'llship
and the import.an(·t' or a ('iti7.l'nship n''1uirclllt'nt ror
specific activilil's that gn'atly arfect the ('ollllllunity,
RehnlJuist cil<~s Army;", II. /lll:;h and 'I'mI' ". /)"lIt':;
whidl value ('itizl'llship hllt. primarily from a lIalural
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rights view. III rc Grillitll:; (., I a u.s. 717 II naJ)
decided that t.he legal profession, despite its clOt;e
link with the political process, was open to aliens.
AIt.hough lawyers have tl'aditionally heel} seen as
officers of the court wit.h a llIoral responsibility to
uphold and defend the law, III rc Grimtlls rel1eds
the contemporary view that a lawyer's first
obligation is to his client.
Grilliths argues that
Ia wyers aI'e not oflicials of' the government., although
they do occupy professional positions of' responsibility
and influence that impose on them duties correlative
with their vital right of access to the courts (41:1
U.S. 717 at 72H).
They may be leaders in the
community but being a lawyer docs not "place one
so close to the core' of the political process as to
make him a «lI'mulatol' of' government policy" which
is the standard (II' exclusion set by Sugarman (4 1:1
U.S. 717 at 729).
In this view, lawyers arc
pmteded under the Fourteenth Amendment from a
citizcnship I'cquircmcnt..
In f'ollowing Sugarmall, /I'olcy v, COllllelie (4:15
U.S, 2n 1 11977 J) places state troopers in the
category of individuals whose important noneledive
position and broad discretionary powers allow them
to ad significantly as policy formulators.
Police
officers act as government representatives in their
employment.
In allowing a distindion. between
citizens and aliens, .J ustice Burger in the opinion of
the court notes that membership is relevant to
participation:
A new citizen has hecome a member of a
Nation, part of a people distinct. from others
lomit citat.ion I. The individual at that. point,
belongs to the polit.y and IS entitled t~l
part.icipat.e in t.he processes of democrat ic
decision-making (4:1:' Ll.S, ~!l1 at 2!1f).
The differencl' bel ween ,diells alld t:itiwmi lies in
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their rm!mber~hip.
That difference affecl~ their
ability to satisfaclorily fulfill the obligations of a
state trooper.
In a dissenting opinion, .Justice Stevens states
that troopers are implementors rather than makers
of policy, an opinion shared by .Justices Marshall
and Brennan.
There(c)I'e, political community
membership is not relevant, but the individual's
ability to fulfill the job requirements is.
Stevens
further
dissents
by
arguing
the
inconsistency of Poley v. COllfwlie and III re Grillitlis:
The disqualifying characteristic I in J.'oley I is
apparently a foreign allegiance which raises a
doubt concerning trustworthiness and loyalty so
pervasive that a flat ban agailH;t the
employment of any alien in any law
enforcement posit ion is thought to be justified.
But if the integrity of all aliens is sllspecl,
why may not a State deny aliens the right
tAl pmclice law"! (4:lfl U.S. 2!) I at. :WH).
Stevens feels that the allegiance of aliens should be
as Iitlle, ()J' as much, of an issue for police officers
as fcu' lawyers.
But allegiance is not what distinguishes lawycrs
from
police
offiwrs.
The occupations
arc
fundament.ally ditrcrent. The polin' of"liccr acts as
a I'cpres~ntative of the government granted specific
powers by the eomlllunity and receives his paycheck
di.·eclly from its t.axes, t.hereby just.ifying a
citizenship. requirement.
.Jobs that involve public
represent.ation such as districl attorneys, state
prosecutors, and judges t~ollid ah;o attach a
citizenship requirement, not only becallse the roles
demand the broad public policy formation and
implementation of SIIMlirmllll, but also because they
specifically reprcsent tlw political cOIllIlHmity.
In contemporary view, a Iawyt·r is significantly
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dilfercnt since his prillHlI-y n·sponsibility is to thc
client., not the community of law.
lie does not
represent the political community.
lie derives his
power from employment by the individual; he ean
be hired or fircd acconling to t.he will of t.he
individual; he ren·ives his paydle(-k' from the
individual. lIis activities test and evaluatc t.he rules
set down by t.he political community but he derives
little power from that l~olllmunit.y. Lawyers do not
rcpresent the public and Uwrelilre should not be
SUbjl'ct to a l'itizenship rcquin·menl.
By thesc
contemporary standards which stress individual rights
rathc," than communit.y responsibility, Inn' (;rilliths
and Foley u. Conndic arc nol inconsistent..
Ambach IJ. Norwick (441 U.S. ()H ,IB7BI) serves
as another example of tlw communit.y limit.ing the
participal ion of aliens in I Ill' polit.ical process.
According to .Justin~ Powell's opinion of t.he court,
public school t.eachers perfill-m a role that goes 10
the heart of represental ive government and in
accordancc with SUf{urmfln may bc subject to a
citizenship rcquiremenl.
In Ambach the intent to
bennne a cit.izen is sullieient. qllalilicalion 'ill- t.hose
who are prevented from becoming citizens due IA' a
lengt.h or residence requirement.
In furthering
Sugarmnn,
Ambadl
holds
that
a
citizenship
qualification for public sdlllol teachers does not
violate the I~qual Protection Clause since "some state
functions are so bound up wit.h the operation or the
Slat.e as a government.al entit.y as to permit the
exclusion from those functions of all persons who
have not become part of lhe process of selfgovernment" (441 U.S. fiH at 74).
Relying on
/t'oley, Ambw:h dcems public education "a most
fundamcntal
obligation
of govenllnent to
its
constitucncy," as fundamental even as the police
function.
Similarly, the inlluenw of a teal"lwr is
"crucial to the continued good Iwalth of a
democracy" (.14 1 U.S. liH al 7!1).
Amlmt"ir

I

CITIZII~NSIII

P

lor;

re(:ognizes the teadll'r's pow .... f'ul though not political
role in transmitting the values and traditions of' the
communit.y and deems the cOlllmllllity int.erest
sufficient to its exclusion of' IlIIn-members f'rom t.hat
role.
The dissenting opinion o f"fi! red
by .J IIstiee
Blackmun and joinl,d by .'ustiees Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens, once again argiles t.he inconsistency of
111 rc Griffiths and A mb(l(~".
Why should a state
allow resident aliens to take a har exam and 'lu<llif'y
In practice law if teachers arc barred frulll
employment in the public schools'!
Lawyers arc
signifi ..:ant role model!; t.oo(441 U.S. fiH at HH). As
in the cont.roversy between I""ley and 111 rc Grill/tlls,
the I'eal issue is public versus private roles. The
public school teacher acts in a public role, recdving
his paycheck from the community, while the
attorney docs nolo
1~!Jually import.ant, Ambach
places a citizenship refJlIirement only on puhlic school
teachel·s.
Private institutions lTlay hire whomever
they wish, n~gardless of' citizcnship stat.us.
Although sensitive to natural rights arguments
about the discriminat.ion that may result f'rom
catego.-izing individuals, like -""MarmUII, Cubdl ".
Chtwcz-Sulido (454 U.S. 4:12 II !tH21) recognizes lhe
community's interest. in defining itself':
The
exclusion
of'
aliens
from
basic
governmental processes is not a deficiency in
the demo('l"atic system but a necessary
consequence of' the community's process of
polit.ical self'-definition.
Aliens arc by
definition those outside of" t.his cOlllnlllllily (.\ 54
U.S. 4:12 at. 4:m, Hn).
Thruugh its n,liam'(' on -",,/:ur"'(III, Fol!'y, and
Am/mdl, (;""1'11 suhjt'cts probat.ion and deput.y
pl'Obat.ion onkers t.o a cilizcllship rl'll Uirellll'lIt.
the
basic
bound
up
in
because
the y
an'
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governmental pl'Ocess; t.heir participat.ory role belongs
t.o t.he citizcn.
I'l'Ohat.ion and deputy' probation
officcrs perflll'm a fundion essent.ial t~) tilt! political
community.
Cubell pmvides an interesting insight inu) when
aliens may be excluded and when they may not.
The distinction hetween aliens and citizcns is suspect
when applied t.o distribution of economic benefits. but
"it is a relevant ground fill' det.ermining membership
in the polit.ical community" (454 U.S. 4:12 at 4:12).
The different roles of subject and citizcn underlie
this distinction.
On the other hand. many significant occupations
do not fall within the st.andal·d sci by Sugarmall and
extended by Ambw:h. Poley. and Cabell.
The
community cannot prescribe rules against alien
pal·ticipation in occupations that are not bound up
in the very essence of democratic governmcnt The
position of lawyer previously discussed is an
cxample. Nor can the government exclude the alien
fmm dist.rihution of many economic henclits. In the
private, non-political realm t.he alien is as free as
t.he citizen. This inclusion of t.he alien in t.he nonpolitical I'Oles of life seems fairly consist.ent. wit.h a
conventional
appmach
t.o memhership.
The
community did not. want to exclude the alien from
all participation or he would not have been allowed
within the boundaries of the nation in t.he first
place.
lIis legal presence is the community's
consent to some sort of participat.ion on his part.
The community only excludes t.lw alien f\"()m t.hose
roles where membership is important in a political
sense.
Start.ing in In 15 with '/'f"IlUX II. Uuic" (2:H) U.S.
:l:n, the Comt decided that.
It requires no argument t.o show t.hat. the right
U) work for a living in t.he nITnmllfl

(wl"lI/JUtiIlIlS

of t.he colllnlllllity is of t.he very essence of the
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personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
pUl'pose of the I Fourteenl h I Amendment to ~ecurc.
. . . If this could be refused ~olely upon the
gmund of race or nal ionality ,the prohihition of the
denial to any person of the equal protection of
the laws would be a barren form of words (2:W
U.S. :1:1 at 41).
The reference back I~) Yi/,k \VO v. lIophlls along
with the defense of alien participation in common
occupations, indicales that the alien is primarily
excluded from the community's political self-definition
but not fnllll activities Ihat are part of everyday
life.
The issue of discrimination is important
because it impinges "upon the conduct of ordinary
pl'ivalc enterprise" (:~:H. U.S. :1:1 at 40).
In the
political realm, community desire weighs heavily; in
the non-political realm the individual's rights, citizen
or not, are virtually invincible.
Like 'I'rllClX, Takahashi /J. f.'ish Will Gllme
Commission (:1:14 U.S. 410 I H)481) affirms the right
of aliens to pa,·ticipate in the common occupations
of the community.
Initially, Torao Takahashi was
excluded fnun fishing off the coasts of California
because he was an alien.
The Supreme Court
decided that the ability of a state to "apply its laws
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a dass is
confined within narrow limits" especially in terms of
occupations (:l34 U.S ... 10 at 420). If a compelling
state interest (an important and justifiable stale need
such as self-definition of the political community)
could be demonstrated, Ihen exclusion of alil'ns might
be justified.
Otherwise, exclusion of individuals
lawfully admiUed I~) I he political l'olJllllunity is not
justified.

EXPATRIATION
Natural .. ight~ alld contract Uwory not only
the wayan individual bpl'ollH's a nll'lJlb,'r
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of a societ.y, hut. also whetlwr or not. Lhat. relat.ioll
can he terminaled.
If a ('ommunily grant.s
citizenship based uJlon its own slwl'ific criteria, can
it also t.ake it away,! Theoretically, t.he answpr is
yes, eSlJecially if the cont.ractual approach is
emphasized. What one grants, one can- withd,-aw.
Nonetheless, court cases indicat.e t hat in practice
once one receives membership, it is the individual
rathe,- than the community that. retains the right to
sever the relationship. I n an strong application of
natural righl.s t1wO/-y, the Cow-I. finds that even acts
Ihe community has specifically designated as
expatriating cannot deprive an individual of his
citizenship. The Court's strong position emphasizes
natural rights far more than does the community.
A/i-oyim v. !lush (:lR7 U.S. 2r.a IIH()7J) sets the
current precedent for expatriation issues.
In this
instance, an individual of Polish descent naturuliwd
as a citizen of the United States voted in a political
election in Israel. Section 4() I (l') of the Nat.ionality
Act of I H4() defines vot.ing in a foreign political
election as an expatriating acl. Afmyim's passport
n~newal request was denied by till' U.S. Department
of St.atl' based on his violation of this st.at.ut.e. The
Supreme Court however supported Afroyim's claim
t.hat he was still a United St.at.es eitiwn because he
had not expressly renoUlwed that (~il.izenship:
We hold lhat. the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed t.o, and does pmit'd every citizen of
Ihis Nation against a congn~ssional fillTible
deslrul'l ion of his citizenship, what.ever his
crl'ed, color, or race.
Our holding does no
more than 10 give to this citizen t.hat which
is his own, a constitutional right to remain a
citizen in a free counl.t-y unless he voluntarily
,"elinquishcs thaI l'ilizcnship (:IR7 U.S. 2r.:1,
at 2(jR).

I

Clrl'IZI~NSHIP

IO!I

The Court. essentially provides the comITlImit.y no
power to scvcr the relationship or citizcnship; the
individual's dccision is pm'amount.
Just prior t.o this ,'ccognition of the allsolutc right
or t.he citi",en to retain his membcrship no matt.er
what his actions, the COUlt emphasizes t.he
communal nat.ure or dtizenship in the United St.at.es.
I mnically, this st.aLcment. stands in stark cont.rast
with Uw powerlessness of Uw community to
del.ermine that membership:
Citizenship in t.his Nation is a parI of' a
coopel'Utivc afTair. Its citizcnry is the country
and the country is its citizenry.
The very
nature of Oll/' f','cc governmcnt. makes it
completciy incongnlOus to have a rulc of Ia w
under which a group of citizens temporarily
in ofTiee ('an deprive anlltlH'/' gl'llup of ('itiwns
or their citizenship (:lH7 U,S, 25:l at 2liH),
If citizenship is a coopc/'ativl' ,llfair, the individual
has a
responsibility lowanls t.he comITlIlI1ity.
Communit.y and country imply cooperat ion in \.\-ays
that Afroyim IJ. Ull.~k and its later applicat.ions have
denied.
Furt.hermore, what. t.his majorit.y opinion docs not.
recognize evcn in its valuing 01' coopcration, is
constructive unanimity and rule of law. The COllrt
docs not. use till' t.erm rule 01' law as a nwtalcgal
principle, hut more as the rule of a particular law.
The dist.inction is of great importanee. If a nat.ion
is abiding by !'ule of law as previously deli Ill'd , it
will not. set lip discriminatory standards against
those who a/'(~ already ITwmlwrs of' the comlllllllit.y.
The nat.ion may, howcver, choose (,0 ,,"oted itself
against those adions that would be parlieulal'ly
disrupt.ive t.o the unil., against those illdivilhlals who
violat.c.~ t.11t' (,(lIlvCllliollS alld do /10" fullill
tlwi ..
I'l~sponsibili"y t.o mailltain thl' system from which
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they benefit. By arguing that one group of citiwns
might. deprive another of citi:t.l'm.;liip based on "creed,
color, or race" t.he Court assumes lhat the
communit.y follows majorit.y rule rather t.han
consl.l'uctive ullanimity, Minorities of whaleve/' kind
could he discriminated against II/Jlll'r majority rule.
They would not. he discrimillatl'd against under a
syst.em of rule of law alld construcl.ive unanimity.
If citiwnship is a cooperative affair as the Court.
agrees, then the individual must have some
rm;ponsihility to cooperat.e.
Abiding by lhe
convenlions of the cOlllll1unily is a logical demonsl.mUon of cooperation.
By arguing thal the
individual's "voluntary renunciation" of cilizenship is
required before he can be expalriated, the courl
denies any responsibility of the individual towards
the community. Two eases decided prior to Armyim
but following essenlially lhe same logic support. lhe
idea thai the individual's violation of convent.ions, or
wit.hholding of consenl, docs nol granl the communit.y power to expalriate him.
In l'mp II. /Julies (:15(i U.S. Ht) 1l!)!,)7!), a nativebOl'll American was considercd 10 have expatriated
himself by wart.ime desertion ill violalion of secl.ion
401 (g) of the Nationalit,y Ad of 1!)40.
Chief
.J ustke Warren presents his opinion and is joined /"y
.J uslices Black, Douglas, and Whillaker. lie argues
lhat "lhe dUlies of citi:t.enship arc numerous, and the
discharge of many of lhese ohligations is essential
tAl lhe security and well-being of lhe Nat.ion" (:l5ti
U.S. Hti at 92), and lhal the ciliwn who docs nol
fulfill lhese basic responsibilities, be ,thcy lax
obligalions or lIll' obligat,ion to bc honesl, may
scriously damagc lhe niltion. Warrcn thcn asks a
rlll'torical qucstion and bascs his furthcr aq~umcnl
on t.he assumpt.ion thai lhc answer is no: ''('ould a
citizen be deprived of his nationality lill' evading
I.hl'HC baHic rcspOlIHilJilil.ics of cil.iwnship?" WalTcn's
heHt HlIIlIlIl<lriws his position in "citizl'nship is not
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a liceIH;e that expires UPOJI mishelwvior.
citiwnship is not lost every time a duty of
citizenship is shirked" (:151, U.S. H(j at !l~).
While granting that citizenshiIJ is not revoked fill·
violation of some duties of citizenship, a felony
cunvictiun for tax evasion or fl·aud, severely
circumscribes the individual's ability to participate
in the political process. lie docs not lose civil rights
but loses all rights of citizenship. Like an alien he
cannot participate in lhe political process, lhough he
retains lhe title of citizen. CitizeJlship itself is not
lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked, but
the political role is limited to the degree that one
has violated the conventions of the community. If
a citizen docs not violate any cOJlventions or laws,
then his participation remains intact.
Since Warren also n.~cognizcs t hat failure to
perform the basic duties of citizenship may cause a
"dangerous blow" or "serious injury" to the
community, one wonders how the community could
defend itself against such violence.
Warren docs
grant that "in appropl"iatc circumstances, the
punishing power is available to deal with derelictions
of duty," but one could hardly imagine a dereliction
of duty more serious than the desertion in wartime
at issue in 'I'mI'. If the community has no right t~)
demand the execution of basic duties from its
citizens, such as military service, then lhe nation
hardly has a tfut.y til provide benefit.s to those
citi ....ens, such as defense against. an enemy. If no
one will serve t.here (:an be lUI defense.
In theil: dissenting opinion, .J ustices Frankfurter,
Burton, Clark and l1.lI·lan support the contract ual
concept. of citizenship
by
demollstrat.ing
t.he
desirahilit.y of allowing a nation to protcel itself
against injury from within as well as from without:
"One of the principal purposes in establishing the
Constitution was to ' provide for the common
defense'" (:J5(j U.S. H(i at 12(). Moreover,
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possession hy an American eiti:l.en of t.he rights
and
privileges t.hat. cOlIst.itute dtiwnship
imposes co ....elative obligat.ions, or whkh t.he
most. indispensahle may wcll be . t.o t.ake his
place in t.he ranks or t.he army of his count.ry
and .-isk the chance of being shot down' in it.s
defense' Jueobsl'TI II. MnsslII-/",sdts, I B7 lJ .S.
11, 2~)" (:ISn U.S. Hli, 121).
Their argument. is essentially a recognition (If t.he
duties of the individual that accompany the benefits
pl'Ovided by the community of t.he Constit.ut ion.
In a similar case, KCTlfII:dy /J. MCTldozo-MurtiTla,
milit.ary service was OIWC again at issue. Ifere an
individual evaded lhe draft. by living out.side of t.he
Ill' t.hen relurned t.o t.he Unit.ed
Unit.ed St.at.es.
Stat.es and was conviet.ed of draft. evasion pursuant
to Section I I of t.he Selective Training and Service
Act of I H40 and his dti7.l'nship was questioned.
The Court. held t.hat. "t.he Constit.ut.ion is silent. about
the pel'missibilit.y of involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship rights" and more impmtant.ly that "while
it [the Constit.ut.ion I confirms citizenship rights,
plainly there are imperative oLligations of citizenship,
pel'f{it'mance of which Congress in the exercise of its
powel's may const.itutionally exael" (:172 U.S. 144
at 15H).
.Just as in 7'mp v. /Julies, these
statement.s seem t.o recognize lhe power of the
community to exact duties from the citiwns it
proteels. Nonetheless, the Court aflil'med lhe lower
court ruling that Mendoza-Martinez did not lose his
citizenship, t.Ill1S in pradice ensuring that the
communit.y could not. exad ohligations from its
memLers.
In VUTlCl: I). 7'amzus (441 U.S. 252 11!J7!l)),
Sedion
:l4B
(a)(2) of the
Immigrat.ion
and
Nationality Ad is called inl.o quest.ioll. This st'dioll
states specifically that an American citizen who
takes an oath or allegiance 10 a li,reign Htale will
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LaurencG.1. Terrazas, who
claimed a dual nat.ionality because of Mexican
parentage and U.S. birth place, took an oath of
allegiance whereby he swore n' adherence, obedience,
and submission t.o the laws and aut.horities of the
Mexican Republic' and 'expressly renouncledl Unit.ed
St.at.es citizenship, as well as any suhmission,
obedience, and loyalty to any foreign govenllnent,
especially to that of the UniteJ States of America'"
(444 U.S. 252 at 25f1). While such an explicit oath
of allegiance would seem sufficient juslirication for
,'evocation of citizenship based on t.he voluntary
"enunciation J"Cquirement of Af;'oyim, the Supreme
Court decided that Termzas really had not illtendl!d
to renounce his American citizcnship even while
voluntarily pe"fonning what Congress had defined as
an expatriating act. The burden of proof falls upon
Congress; there was not a preponderance of evidence
to show that TClTllZaS intended to relinquish his
citizenship (444 U.S. 252 at 270). The community
has very liUle reenUl"se if even sueh an explicit
statement does not delllonstmt.e int.ent.
A final case decided by the New York Fl·deral
Dish'iet Court on the precedent of Ali"Oyim II. !lllsk
presents a unique example of the individual having
it all his own way.
Ku/ulIIl! ". Sc-Il/lliz ((i5:J F.
Supp. 14RH IIHR71), Rabbi Meir Kahanc alTl'ptcd a
seat in the Israeli Knesset in violation of several
immigration anti nat.uralizat.ion codes whieh define
serving in a '<,reign governlllent. as an expatriat.ing
act..
Kahane argut's t.hat. while he knowingly
cmnmiU.ed an expatri,lting act., he IIl'Vl'r ;11/1'"<1",, to
relinquish· his (~itizl'nship.
He alld his lawYl'rs
I"l'pl'at.mlly wrot.e IpliNs t.o t.he U.S. Ilepartllll'nt. of
Stat.e affirming his inlent 10 J'('lIlain a lJ .S. fit izen.
In upholding Kahane'!,; U.S. riti/.enship, l'Vl'n as lit'
::iut in the Knessl't alld had aspirations to till'
position of Prinl(' Minist('r 01" Israel (1<'. SlIpp. '·1Xti
a I J.1 XU), til(' Dist rid Court ("it ('d til(' pn'redenl of
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AJi'oyim and quoted Terrazl/s: "In the last analysis,
expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rathel'
than on the will of Congress and its assessment of
his conducl" (444 U.S. 21)2 at 2(i()).
Mayan individllal then do what he pleases with
total disregard f()r the will of the community as
defined by Congress, desert. in time of war, pledge
allegiance to a f()reign government while renouncing
U.S. citizenship, serve a foreign power, vule in
foreign political elect ions"! The Court seems to say
yes. Such a decision leaves itself open for abuse
and goes fal' beyond lhe individual I'ighls conception
held by Congress, although according to construclive
unanimity and rule of law it is Congrt.~ss, not the
Court, who should decide these issues.
I n a perfect society cel·tainly no ont.' would lie
about his intentions; certainly no one would have
bad intentions in the first place.
Nonet.heless,
society is not perfect. An individual could intend to
remain a citiwn of the Unit.ed St.at.es, or declare
that his int.ent had been t.o remain a citizen when
it .-cally was not, merely fill' the bendits received
rat her than out of a sense of community OJ'
allegiance.
Kahane serves as a prime example; he freely
admits that. his int.enl. I~) r!!lain U.S. cilizem;hip
centers around his desire 1.0 lecture in t.he Unit.ed
Stat.es, a frcedolll that would be circull1serihed with
ISI'aeli citizenship and his cxtreme political views
((i5~ F. Supp. 14Hti at l4~1()-I).
Whilc recognizing
this as a "less than l:()Jlllllcntiable motive" the
Districl Court argiles t.hat "A/i'oyim and 'I'.".,.IIZUS
teach that an int.~nt to rdain cit.i:t.enship f(II'
hypocrit.ical or cynical reasons is no less valid-legally--than an int~nt prcdi('at~d on the noblest of
alll'llist.ic motives" (HI):I F. Supp. 14Hti at l4H4).
Ilypocrisy is a lethal tool against. the moral
characler of a nation, no maU(~r how legally valid
it may be. The cOIJIIlIllnity is fi)JTI~d to IInderwrite
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and protecl Kahane's individualism but can place
few if any demands on him.
AIUwugh the Dist.riel Court in Kahallt' abo tries
to preempt analogies of citiwJIl:;hiJ) intent with
criminal intent, its arguments arc less than
satisfaetory. The court asserts that criminals may
lie about. their intent in OJ·der to avoid punishment
but t.hat. "an aelm' who states that he wishes tH
remain a citizen is making a st.at.ement about his
own status" and it is therefore impossible for him to
The statement "I want 1.0 remain a citizen"
lie.
cannot be a lie (emphasis in original, (iG:1 F. Supp.
14Hti at. 14!1~, fn. 7),
Of COUI'!:;e the desire to remain a citizen may he
true, and from t.hat standpoint the statement not a
lie, but if the Court views the intent of the
individual as paramount, should not t.he intent
behind stich a statement also be examined'! .J ust as
the criminal may disguise his intent, so may the
citizen. Saying "I am not a murderer" with gun in
hand, and "I am a citizen" with expatriating act
committed arc not that. different; in neither case can
we know real intentions except. as they are
communicated to us by t.he individual. Nevert.heless,
in the fOJ·mel' we allow the community t.he final
decision (manslaughter or murder). In the laUer the
final decision remains with the individual although
his conducl may be as potentially damaging to
community integrity as the presence of a murdel'er
is to the community's physical well·hl'ing.
The Distl'icl Court seems to think that either we
can know the intentions of criminals hy the acts
they commit or that intent is at times irrelevant
t~) the fact that a aime has beclI cmllmiu.ed.
On
the other hand, a citizt~n's aelions do IIOt. always
reveal intent and int.ent is absolutdy necessary t.o
expatriation.
Without. intent, not.hing has really
happened.
NOllcthelm;s, this grant.ing of ahsolutt' right. of
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expatrialion 10 the individual has not always been
recognized.
Prior to A/iny;"" Ihe COlnllHlIlity's
demands hOllnd I Ill' individual 10 a milch 'greal~'r
degree.
Indecd, dissenting opinion in the 5-4
A/i'oyim case tites the majority opinion in Pacz (I.
Hrollllldl (:Hifi U.S. 41 II H57 n, which was overruled
by A/i"oyim. Pl'n~z recognized the greater ability of
the community to define itself and protl'l~t itself by
reqlllrlng altegianee to the laws ii, established
through the legislative process.
Perez II. Ilrowndl presents the case of an
individual who voted in a political election in Mexico
and also remained outside of the United States t.o
avoid the draft..
Retention of U.S. citizenship was
denied due to his violation of section 401 (e) and (j)
of the Nationality Act of 1B40 (amended).
The
Court decided that withdrawal of eitiwnship was not
an arbitrary act but one justified by the "rational
nexus" which
mtlst exist between the content of a specific
power in Congress and the action of Congress
in carrying that power into exe("ution. More
simply stated, the mcans--in this case,
withdrawal of citizenship--must be reasonably
related to the end--here, regulation of foreign
aflairs" (3()(j U.S. 44 at 58).
In Pen~z, the Court recognizes the community's need
to regulale ilself and its memhers sels a reasonable
standard by which the needs of the individual can
be balanced with the needs of the community.
II'
Congress has a specific power or responsibility, it
must also have a means 1.0 carry that power out..
In this case, the community's net'd to carry out
fi,reign affairs ("oherclltly justilil~s till' action takcn
against individuals whose actions threaten the
community.
The Court's opinion stands in stl'Ong
contrast to '/''-01' (I. /)ulll's, K('",wlly I). Melldoza-
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Murtillez, Kahane v. Schultz, alld A/;'(/yim

IJ. /lusk
where the cooJlerative nat.ure of t.he cOlTllllunity is
I'ecognized, but any
means of carrying out
communit.y responsihilit.ies is valid only if it. does not.
impinge in any degree on lhe individual's will.
By setting a reasonable standard, the Court. in
"erez neithel' advocates lhe extreme individualism
inherent in A/;'(lyim nOl' presses an extreme view
of community. Rather, the need t.o balance the two
serves as a basic and pnlgmalic crit.eria. Vot.ing in
a foreign election seems less potentially damaging
than the desert.ion issue in Tmp and yet Trnp
I'etained his citizenship and
Perez lost hili.
Ironically, Tmp 11. null,',<; and i»erl!Z II. Hroumdl were
bot.h decided on the same day, demonstrating the
inconsistent and at. times confusing applicat.ion of
cont.ractual and natural right.s theories t.o (·itizenship.
Significantly, ",~rez cites the precedl'nt. set by
Mw:kcIlZi,! II. /lun' (2:1!) U.S. 2!l!l) where individual
int.ent was deemed t.ot.ally irrelevant to communit.y
needs. In this case a nalive-born American woman
married an alien and t.hen t.ried lo register to vote.
By reason of her marriage t.o an alien sill' ('eased
to be a Unit.ed Stat.es citizen.
The need of t.he
govenllnent t.() avoid internat.ional ent.anglement.s allll
embarrassments superceded her inlerest in remaining
a citi7.en.
I n contrast t.o i»l'n!z where WalTen
.'ecognizes t.he people as the souree of sovereignty,
the court. in this caSl' views t.he government. itself
as sovereign.
Rat.her than sympat.hizing with the
communit.y's need to defend itself and then
withdnlwing all t.ools of defense, this Court
sympath.i:ws wit.h the individual bUl upholds the
communit.y:

We nmcur wit h COlIllSei t.hat citizenship is of
tangible wort.h, and we sympathize wit h
plaint.ifr in Ill'r desire t.o retain it and in her
earnest. asseltion of it. But t.here is involved
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more t.han personal considerations.
As we
have seen, t.he legislatioll was urged by
condit.ions of national mOllwnl.. . . . It is t.he
coneept.ion of the legislat.ioll limier review that
such an ad may hring till' (iovenunen"t. into
emba .... assmcnt.s
and,
it.
may
be,
int.o
cont.roversies. . . (2:W LJ. S. at :J 11-2).
In this case t.he rights of tilt! individual are
suhservient t.o the great.er needs of lIw (~(IInmunity.
1n cont.rast to more recent ca~:iCS even he.· desire
and int.ent. UI relain cit.izenship are irrelevant U)
those greater needs .
•Just as he presellted a strong case for the
individual in the 'J'rop decision, so Chief .Justice
WalTen argues strongly 't)r natural rights in his
dissenting opinion in Pcn~z.
Since the sovereignty
of the United States government stems from the
people, the "citizens themselves are sovereign, and
their citizenship is not subject. U) the general powers
of their government" (:J5() U.S. 44 at 65).
lie
likewise argues that "citizenship is man's basic right
for it is nothing less than the right. U) have rights.
In this country the expatriate would
presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights
and pJ"ivileges of aliens . . . II ( :J56 U.s. 44 at 64).
Although retention of citizenship may be a basic
right granted U) the dtizen hy the communit.y,
ciliwnship is hardly mankind's basic right; not even
WalTen extemls citizcnship privileges U) aliens.
MOI·eover, citizenship is really not the right to have
rights since the equal prot.edion and due process
cJamlCs apply quit.e hroadly to all persons O';£:k WO
IJ.
Jlopkins); rather, citizenship is the right t.o
part.icipat~~ and influellce the political adivity of t.he
Such a distinction between the right
cOlTllllunity.
t~1 have rights in genl'ral alld t.he right t.o participate
politically shows the ndevalll'e of citizenship and
subjed rolt~s ill the cOlllnHlllily.
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/,Ilriu II. Ullited Stoies (2:11 U.S. H II!tI:ID,
decided long before I'crl'z, demonstrates clearly that
membership in a community implies reciprocal
responsibility on t.he part of the individual and the
community (2;' I U.S. H at 22). Significantly, the
Supreme Court expressly recognizes that the
granting of citizenship be beneficial for both the
individual and the community: "In other words, it
was contemplaLcd that his admission should be
mutually beneficial to the Government and himself
•
•
•
tI
(231 U.S. n at 2:1).
Conventions and
coordination solutions come about precisely because
they are mutually beneficial to those involved. One
would not enter into an agreement if there were no
benefits.
Mutual benefit is a valid standard by
which we include or exclude individuals from
participation in a political community. Despite the
strong I'ecognition of community in both Perez and
I.Il r;u , the relative paucity of expatriat ion cases t.hat
expressly
support
the contractual
theory
of
citizenship wfleds the Court's stronger tendency
towards nat.ural right.s t.heory.

CONCLUSION
The inconsist.ent allli wntradictory applic<lt.ion of
natural rights and cont.ract theory in the Court's
development of citizenship reflects its dirficult nature.
Nonetheless, t.he essl~ntially conventional aspects of
communit.y in general ilnd cit.izenship in part.icular
ensure an ongoing balance het ween the t.wo
approadlCs, despite the Court.'s rewnt. emphasis on
natural rights.
Citizenship, as a coordinat.ion
solut.ion, delines the roles appmpriate t.o insiders and
out.sidl~rs, in acconiallce wit.h the values of the
community.
III
a
communit.y
that values rights,
t.he
convent.ions of nWllIhcrship will rdlcd t.hat. vahw, as
\' id~ \Yo II. lIopkil/s d"lIlOlIst.ral.cs.
Even with an

I~()

PI SIGMA ALPI-IA

HEVIl~W

emphasis Oil rights, it is the l'ollllllunity, Ilot t.he
individual, that determines the extent and nature 0('
those right.s,
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